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Abstract This article presents a comparative review of the knowledge base regarding 
human behaviour in emergencies for both aviation and rail domains. Generic models of 
human behaviour in emergency situations are introduced and specific attention is then 
focussed on methods of behaviour prediction, exhibited behaviours in emergencies and 
methods of aiding evacuation across both modes of transport. Using established knowledge 
from the aviation domain, it has been possible to make observations and comparisons about 
the rail domain. Traditionally, the aviation domain has been a major focus of research 
attention and this is used to inform and interpret the rail domain. By drawing comparisons 
across these domains for human behaviour in emergency situations, the observations are 
discussed along with recommendations for future policies/planning for emergencies and 
future research areas. 
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Introduction 
On 15 January 2009, 6 min after takeoff from LaGuardia Airport and as a result of a 
birdstrike incident during its initial ascent, an Airbus A320-214 successfully landed in the 
Hudson River close to midtown Manhattan. In many ways, the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB, 2010) regarded the incident as a miraculous landing because of few 
passengers or crew sustaining any serious injuries. Overall, the evacuation of passengers was 
relatively orderly and timely, however, in the subsequent accident investigation a number of 
issues were highlighted that could have led to a more serious situation. With the rear end of 
the aircraft immersed in water, passengers seated in this area were not able to exit through 
their nearest emergency exits. As a result, they moved forward, towards the over-wing exits 
and flight attendants later reported that passengers crowded and ‘bottlenecked’ at these exit 
points (NTSB, 2010). As queues had already developed to exit through these doors further 
bottlenecking occurred along the passageways. This situation was only alleviated when cabin 
crew took control of the situation and called passengers forward to the front emergency exits. 
It was also reported that as the water levels at the rear of the aircraft rose quickly, cabin crew 
ordered passengers to climb over seat backs rather than use the passageways in order to reach 
a usable exit (NTSB, 2010). This action may have helped alleviate crowding and kept any 
casualties or injuries to a minimum. 
Later the same year (18 May 2009) a station closure at Kings Cross Railway Station 
on the London Underground network resulted in over-crowding at exits and widespread 
public concern over the handling of the situation. The Confidential Incident Reporting and 
Analysis System for the rail industry (CIRAS, 2009) outlined two incidents (a defective train 
that took 25min to reach its destination and a pregnant passenger going into labour elsewhere 
on the underground network) that caused the station to become congested and then to be 
closed. The effect of this was that widespread crowding occurred both inside and outside the 
station. In the immediate confusion and lack of situational knowledge, there appeared to be 
no procedures in place to disperse members of the public once they had left the only exit to 
the station (a situation confounded because of ongoing building work inside the station 
blocking other exits). There were no station personnel to instruct passengers to move on or to 
turn those away who were still trying to enter and, as the crowd built up, it got harder for 
people who were still inside the station to get out (CIRAS, 2009). The problem was 
compounded as members of public who smoked cigarettes normally congregated around the 
exit adding to the increasing bottleneck situation. In contrast to the previous example, the 
station evacuation was not effectively organised; there was a lack of efficient crowd control 
measures in place as well as an awareness of other behaviours (such as smoking) that 
exacerbated the situation. 
These examples illustrate how emergency situations can evolve and become quickly 
exacerbated with often little warning for passengers and characterised by initial confusion, 
sometimes apparently chaotic behaviours and an underlying importance that trained staff are 
present to mediate these initial factors. However, in these situations it is important to 
understand how members of the public might behave and respond to real or perceived 
dangers confronting them. 
 
 Models of Behaviour in Emergencies 
Various models of human behaviour have been developed to help explain how people react in 
emergency situations. They each take a different perspective on human behaviour and no 
single theory has emerged as the leading paradigm. This underlines the complexity of 
understanding human behaviour in these situations and the need for an integrated approach to 
develop more robust policies for handling emergencies. There are also important lessons to 
be learned across different modes of transport in order to inform the public and policymakers 
alike. From the study of human behaviour in emergencies over the last 50 years, a number of 
established models exist: 
 
● Panic model (Sime, 1980) and bounded rationality (March, 1994; Pan et al, 2006) 
● Social attachment model (Mawson, 1978, 1980) and affiliation model (Mawson, 2005) 
● Self categorisation model (Turner et al, 1987) and emergent norm theory (Turner, 1964) 
 
Panic model and bounded rationality 
The panic model assumes that members of the public become overwhelmed in emergencies 
leading to confusion, disorientation and a lack of coordination (Sime, 1980). This type of 
behaviour was illustrated in the station example above. Building on the traditional view of a 
‘fight or flight’ response under extreme stress (usually as a function of adrenaline released 
into the bloodstream) panic can be defined as an inappropriate (or excessive) response to a 
stimulus (Mawson, 2005). This model considers the movement of people in public spaces as 
uncoordinated objects that behave irrationally, selfishly, competitively, anti-socially and who 
may abandon social norms (Drury, 2004). This type of behaviour might be exhibited when 
people become aware of an emergency situation too late to evacuate in an orderly manner 
(Sime, 1983). In what often appears to support the principles of a panic model, bottlenecks at 
exit points may occur because of a large number of people attempting to leave through the 
same restricted route (Sime, 1983). A consequence of the panic model is that uncoordinated 
behaviours can lead to large physical forces being exerted on people and environmental 
structures that can then lead to crowd crushing. Although this type of behaviour can occur in 
emergency situations, it can be largely negated if people are given usable information about 
an incident (Cocking et al, 2009). In all but a few examples, the panic model has been 
contested as people often exhibit some rational behaviours and social norms can remain intact 
(Drury, 2004). 
A further critique of the panic model is presented with the theory of bounded 
rationality (Pan et al, 2006). This theory argues that individuals are capable of making 
rational decisions in an emergency, albeit with limited information and cognitive resources 
(March, 1994). The seriousness of an impending emergency may take longer to perceive and 
evaluate as people might be distracted by other normal events, and the immediate situation 
might receive more attention than speculating on future scenarios (Pan et al, 2006). As a 
consequence, this may lead to apparently non-supportive crowd behaviours. For example, if a 
queue stops moving an individual may push the person in front to resolve their immediate 
situation without thinking through the impact of their behaviour in crowding an exit and 
slowing egress (Pan et al, 2006). 
 
Social attachment and affiliation models 
Attachment and affiliation models acknowledge the social nature of human behaviour and 
present the argument that people will gravitate towards familiar places, groups and/or 
individuals even if this leads them away from immediate safety, or that they might remain in 
a dangerous situation longer if familiar people are with them or require their help (Mawson, 
1978, 1980, 2005). Both models propose that it is more stressful for humans to be detached 
from familiarity than to be exposed to danger (Mawson, 2005). Being among familiar people 
can have a calming effect but can also slow down or reduce opportunities for egress (as 
illustrated in the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre) because of greater efforts to 
help friends and colleagues, rather than immediate individual evacuation (Aguirre et al, 
1998). The affiliation model helps explain why individuals might exit the same way that they 
entered a building rather than evaluate all possible alternatives or actively search out the 
nearest emergency exit. The reasoning for this is that as specific fire exits that are not 
commonly used therefore represent unfamiliar exit routes (Mawson, 2005). People are less 
likely to use them because of their lack of salience than a more familiar main route (Sime, 
1983; Mawson, 2005). 
 
Self-categorisation model and emergent norm theory 
The self-categorisation model argues that members of crowds tend to conform to social 
norms that characterise emergency situations (Cocking et al, 2009). It also states that a sense 
of common identity is created within informal groups in these situations particularly when 
individuals do not know one another. Incident reports often recount how leaders emerge to 
coordinate activities or physically stronger members of a group have delayed their egress to 
aid weaker or injured group members (Sime, 1983).  
Related to the self-categorisation model, emergent norm theory argues that in unusual 
circumstances, collective behaviours evolve as people re-define their situation, by interacting 
to form new processes that guide their behaviour (Aguirre et al, 1998). Manifestations of this 
theory in emergencies have included quicker responses by small (rather than large) groups 
and smaller groups having greater chances of survival than larger groups (Feinberg and 
Johnson, 2001). An explanation for this is that larger groups expend more effort, energy, 
resources and time through extended interactions in defining and proposing strategies with an 
emphasis on evacuating the whole group rather than focussing on specific actions for 
evacuation (Cocking et al, 2009). As a result, ‘evacuation by committee’ can be hampered by 
developing multiple hypotheses that are only partially tested. Another aspect of this 
behaviour could be the way in which we process and store mental schemata associated with 
physical locations we remember (for example, evacuation exits) and or category exemplars 
that constitute fuzzy representations of what elements people might expect to find (and 
where) (for example, the siting of evacuation tools by windows and extinguishers by exits). 
In this way, people develop cognitive representations of the social self-categorisation model 
that may (or may not) help them in a real emergency situation. 
Figure 1 illustrates the key models of human behaviour in emergencies based on 
indices of rationality and social norms. 
INSERT FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE 
To clarify the principles of the models they have been positioned along the axes of 
rationality (ranging from irrational to rational) and social norms (ranging from high to low). 
These are critical factors that differentiate the models. For example, the panic model suggests 
mainly irrational behaviour and low influence of social norms whereas the emergent norm 
theory is associated with more rational behaviour, but remains towards the lower end of the 
social norm axis because of the emphasis on emergent social behaviour in crises. The self 
categorisation model sits higher on both axes as it is built upon social consensus and more 
rational behaviours. 
 
 
 
 
Aviation: Human Behaviour in Emergencies 
Methods of behaviour prediction 
It is critical both in the everyday use of aircraft and in emergencies that passengers are able to 
exit aircraft quickly and efficiently. With the drive towards increased regulation by agencies 
such as the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), 
aircraft manufacturers should ensure that the full evacuation of an aircraft is completed 
within 90 seconds (Muir, 1996). It also specifies that demonstrations should be conducted in 
daylight and darkness (with only the aircraft’s emergency lighting system to illuminate the 
exit paths and evacuation slides). In addition to this, according to the Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA, 1993), a range of participants must be used and no more than half of the 
emergency exits may be operational in trials. 
A range of methods can be employed to investigate aircraft evacuation. One approach 
involves using human volunteers in full-scale evacuation trials (OTA, 1993). This approach 
allows for real user data to be collected, however such trials have a number of limitations. 
They can be hazardous to conduct as participants have been injured in the past (OTA, 1993) 
and are often expensive to organise. Full-scale trials can also suffer from a lack of 
ecologically validity if they are not representative of emergency situations. In any trial it is 
difficult to reproduce the effects of decompression, or an impact or fire from which 
passengers must evacuate (OTA, 1993). In addition, although trial participants should 
represent typical passenger demographics, this approach has been criticised for using able 
bodied and younger participants (Muir and Thomas, 2004). As these trials do not always use 
representative groups of people and as they do not necessarily simulate the traumatic effects 
of an aircraft accident, it is often the case that the results produced are optimistic (OTA, 
1993). However, exposing participants to fire, smoke and/or debris would increase the danger 
posed to them leading to serious ethical issues for this kind of research. Any method of 
predicting human behaviour in emergencies that involves participants therefore has to involve 
a trade-off between levels of realism and the potential to cause mental or physical harm to 
participants (Muir, 1996). As a result of this, alternative methods of predicting human 
behaviour in aircraft emergencies would be beneficial. 
Aircraft cabin simulators may provide an alternative to full-scale evacuations as they 
offer a safe and more controlled environment for testing human behaviour in aircraft 
emergencies. These simulators may contain evacuation slides, oxygen masks, seatbelts, life 
jackets and refreshment trolleys and it may also be possible to reconfigure the layout to 
emulate different types of aircraft or disrupted environments caused in an accident (for 
example, spilt and fallen debris blocking gangways and exits). Simulators such as these have 
been used to investigate passenger egress rates in different types of emergencies and to 
examine the procedures that cabin crew follow. Trials can be conducted with the cabin filled 
with nontoxic smoke and participants have been filmed during evacuations using thermal 
imaging or infra-red sensitive cameras (Muir, 1996). This offers a powerful analysis tool as 
well as educational and training material for future use. 
Another alternative is to use computer-based models to simulate emergency 
situations. These are often more cost effective and safer than full-scale evacuations or cabin 
simulators, however they require an extensive and complex database of factual information in 
order to provide realistic outputs (Owen et al, 1999). The data required are often obtained 
from accident reports however this can be hard to obtain and analyse in a systematic fashion. 
Computer-based models can, however, provide information regarding the physical, 
psychological and physiological responses of humans that may influence egress (Galea et al, 
2003). Software such as ‘airEXODUS’ can be used to simulate aircraft evacuations using 
various sub-models that interact with each another in order to produce realistic outputs of 
human behaviour (Galea et al, 2003). These sub-models include characteristics of individuals 
(differentiating between passengers and cabin crew) and their responses to their environment 
(including immediate responses and overall goals). This approach can be used to compare 
simulated and real evacuations, (where exhibited behaviours may differ) and can also 
ascertain whether an aircraft complies with the 90-second certification requirements. In 
addition to this, it can also be used in post-incident analysis of accidents, to develop crew 
training programmes and procedures and to aid future aircraft design (Galea et al, 2003). 
 
Aiding egress in aviation emergencies 
It has been noted that people behave very differently in 90-second certification trials when 
compared with real aviation emergencies (Muir, 1996; Galea et al, 2003). During certification 
trials, people are likely to listen to and obey instructions from cabin crew but in real 
evacuations, passengers may behave more selfishly (Galea et al, 2003). This finding suggests 
that self-interested behaviour is not in line with the theories proposed by the social 
attachment, affiliation or the self-categorisation models. In some real life cases, this self 
centred behaviour has occurred Although in other cases it has been noted that people have 
behaved in a more orderly fashion (Muir et al, 1996). It has been hypothesised that the 
motivation of individual passengers may be a cause of these differences (Muir et al, 1996). If 
the objective is to ensure that everyone on board is evacuated as safely and quickly as 
possible, people tend to collaborate and social norms are retained. If their individual aims are 
to ensure their own safety (and perhaps the safety of their families or friends) they work 
independently and the evacuation process becomes less orderly and more competitive (Galea 
et al, 2003). This in turn may lead to crowding at exits and in aisles as well as behaviours 
such as individuals climbing over others (who have fallen) or over (not always unoccupied) 
seats (Muir et al, 1996). It has been suggested that this type of behaviour is more likely to 
occur when there is a perception of immediate threat to life. By introducing payment 
incentives during trials for the first people to evacuate the aircraft, competitive behaviours 
found in real emergencies can be demonstrated (Muir et al, 1996). Likewise, introducing 
payment incentives for all participants if they evacuate the aircraft within 90 seconds can 
induce the types of collaborative behaviours that may also be found in emergencies (Muir, 
1996; Muir et al, 1996). 
According to the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB, 1988) it has also been 
reported that in some instances, people have been found to freeze in the initial moments of an 
aircraft emergency and that, in particular, older women may be more prone to such behaviour 
(Muir et al, 1996). This can produce a ‘closed-loop’ effect whereby freezing produces a delay 
that, in turn, increases the amount of toxins inhaled, causing people to become incapacitated 
(Owen et al, 1999). Freezing, also known as cognitively induced paralysis, has been 
explained in terms of a person’s cognitive responses to such situations (Leech, 2004). 
Working memory can only retain a certain amount of information at any given time and also 
has a maximum rate at which it can process information (Wickens, 1992). In sub-optimal 
circumstances, and when responding to unfamiliar situations for which no appropriate 
response is embedded in long-term memory, this maximum rate may be reduced and people 
have to rely on immediate perceptions and understanding to rationalise their behaviour 
(Leach, 2004). In addition, other reasons why freezing may occur include a fatalistic 
perception by the individual that that there is no possible way of preventing harm or 
conversely that they fail to assess the full danger of the situation (Muir et al, 1996). 
Hesitation at exits has also been observed that may be because of individuals waiting for the 
exit to clear or considering how to negotiate the exit (Blake et al, 2002). This behaviour can 
exacerbate crowding at exits and affect the behaviour of others and their potential survival.  
In order to ease the evacuation process, cabin configuration is an important factor. 
The design and layout of aircraft furniture (aisle widths and seat dimensions and 
arrangements) and the cognitive processes of the passengers can affect the success of egress 
(Owen et al, 1999). For example, the implementation of floor-level lighting (Muir, 1996) and 
additional space around exits (Muir et al, 1996) as well as the number and location of seats 
and exits, and physical cues leading to exits have been shown to aid egress (Snow et al, 
1970). However, it should be noted that allowing too much space around exits can lead to 
more direct competition rather than a steady stream of people, especially in the case of over-
wing exits (Muir et al, 1996). When competitive behaviours are exhibited, the flow rate of 
people increases as a function of aperture width; however, when non-competitive behaviours 
occur, narrower aperture widths promote faster evacuation times (OTA, 1993). Therefore, in 
situations where individuals are highly motivated to escape, narrow apertures will 
compromise egress rates because of blockages in aisles and around exits. It is evident that the 
likelihood of blockages occurring can be significantly reduced through appropriate 
configurations of cabins (Muir et al, 1996). 
The role of cabin crew has also been investigated. When they are more assertive, 
evacuation times can be significantly reduced (Muir, 1996). It can, therefore, be assumed that 
this has implications for the importance of training cabin crew for such situations so that they 
have existing knowledge of how to behave, as well as coping strategies in order to help 
members of the public who may be in shock (Leach, 2004). It has been suggested that devices 
could be developed that are able to look for and assist people who are suffering from 
cognitively induced paralysis (Leach, 2004). In addition to this, it is thought that if safety and 
evacuation equipment is designed so that it is obvious and intuitive in terms of how if should 
be used without the need for training, the rate of egress should increase (Leach, 2004). 
 
Rail: Human Behaviour in Emergencies 
Methods of behaviour prediction 
In rail travel, emergencies that require evacuation occur relatively infrequently (Galea and 
Gwynne, 2000a). However, it is still important to ensure that in such situations passengers are 
able to exit carriages quickly and safely. In order to make predictions of human behaviour 
and egress times in emergencies, full-scale trials can be conducted and simulation methods 
can also be used. In a similar way to the aviation domain, guidelines from the Railway Group 
Standard Board (RGSB, 2009) dictate minimum egress rates for railway emergencies:  
 
● Where passengers are evacuated from the sides of the carriage, this should be completed 
within 90 seconds 
● When the evacuation is carried out through the end doors of the carriage, there should be a 
minimum passenger flow rate of 30 passengers per minute 
● On occasions where passengers are evacuated to other trains, this should occur within 90 
seconds with a minimum flow rate of 40 passengers per minute where the vehicle is at the 
end of a formation. 
 
All new internal carriage layouts that may affect egress should be validated either through 
evacuation trials or direct comparison with existing designs (RGSB, 2009). 
Apart from the first factor specifying a 90-second rule, unlike the aviation domain, the 
guidelines reflect flow rates rather than specific evacuation times from trains (Capote et al, 
2009). However, as a general rule, the time required to exit should be less than the available 
time to escape (Jong-Hoon et al, 2009). 
Various methods can be employed in order to predict human behaviour in rail 
emergencies. As in aviation, one such method is the use of computer simulations. Software, 
such as Simulation of Transient and Pedestrian movements can be used to predict pedestrian 
movement in both emergency situations and under normal circumstances. The software 
allows for individual passenger parameters to be incorporated so that specific population 
demographics can be used in trials (Capote et al, 2009). Using detailed plans of rail carriages 
or even platform and station layouts, these models can then be used to identify bottlenecks, 
profile exit use and test different evacuation routes as well as the time taken for egress under 
different circumstances (for example, peak and off-peak travel) (Mott MacDonald, 2010). 
This approach is particularly useful in assessing different train carriage configurations or 
identifying factors that may impact on potential egress in specific situations (for example, for 
large social or sporting events) (Capote et al, 2009). Computer simulations provide a safe 
method of testing emergency evacuations without the need to recruit participants and can also 
be used to evaluate future designs at a virtual prototype stage that cannot be easily trialled 
using human participants (Gwynne et al, 1999). However, the degree of accuracy in computer 
simulations is still a contentious issue because of the lack of emergency evacuation data 
available, the variety of possible scenarios that could be encountered (Capote et al, 2009) and 
timing issues such as time taken to move from the carriage to the trackside (Jong-Hoon et al, 
2009). 
Full-scale trials can also be conducted. These may employ real train carriages and use 
a representative number of participants in an attempt to obtain realistic data. In a similar way 
to aviation research, these trials can make use of atmospheric effects (for example, reduced 
visibility) to provide an insight into how people respond and behave. The use of video 
cameras both inside and outside carriages can aid the analysis of such behaviours (Capote et 
al, 2009). They can also provide information about issues relating to the layout of carriages 
and how their design might help or hinder egress. However, as with computer simulations, 
there are limitations of the use of full-scale trials. 
For ethical reasons, the population demographics are often not representative of real 
life situations. In research trials, passengers are usually young and able-bodied individuals 
and not family groups, elderly or handicapped users who often use trains when driving is less 
suited to their travel needs (Oswald et al, 2005). In addition, participants involved in trials do 
not suffer from injuries or shock induced by the emergency situation (Galea and Gwynne, 
2000a; Oswald et al, 2005). The use of non-toxic smoke also means that trial participants do 
not experience the irritation and heat caused by real smoke (Galea and Gwynne, 2000a). 
In full-scale trials, the participants are usually given a briefing before carrying out the 
evacuation and are therefore more prepared than they would be in reality (Oswald et al, 
2005). Furthermore, when participants have taken part in multiple trials they may have been 
positively influenced by practise and learning effects that affect how they react to each 
situation (Galea and Gwynne, 2000a). These aspects mean that the evacuation times predicted 
in full-scale trials are usually quicker than those in real life situations (Galea and Gwynne, 
2000a; Oswald et al, 2005). 
 
Aiding egress in railway emergencies 
In rail emergencies, there is a threshold below that people tend to respond to a situation 
rationally and exhibit levels cooperative behaviour, often helping each other (Galea and 
Gwynne, 2000a). Above this threshold, people may start to behave in a less collaborative 
manner perhaps because of their perceptions of a more immediate danger. Competitive 
behaviour can also arise as a result of passengers being in confined spaces or in crowded 
conditions typical of rush hour commuting (Galea and Gwynne, 2000a). Previous incidents 
and trials have shown that some passengers may attempt to take on a leadership role, locating 
exits and giving other passengers instructions (Galea and Gwynne, 2000a; Oswald et al, 
2005). It has been suggested that this behaviour may be exhibited by passengers because of 
the comparatively low proportion, or low visibility, of official staff who might otherwise take 
on this role (Oswald et al, 2005). It has also been stated that if people cannot sense any 
danger, they tend to react more slowly to the situation (Kangedal and Nilsson, 2002). 
Studies have shown that when exiting trains, people tend to adopt one or a 
combination of three key strategies: jump from the train; sit on the floor of the train and slide 
out; or use handrails (where installed) to pull themselves out (Oswald et al, 2008). 
Observations have shown that when people adopt the sitting strategy, others can pass through 
the door at the same time. However, both of the other strategies involve the passenger’s body 
spanning the width of the door thereby preventing others from passing simultaneously 
(Oswald et al, 2008). 
On trains people often listen to music, sleep or read and therefore may not take an 
active interest in their surroundings. As such, they are actively engaged or disengaged from 
their environment in terms of maintaining awareness. If passengers do not sense any real 
danger, they may delay their evacuation further by taking time to collect their personal 
belongings (Kangedal and Nilsson, 2002; Capote et al, 2008). In addition, the Rail Safety and 
Standards Board (RSSB, 2007) witness statements from previous incidents have shown that 
when passengers were subject to dark environments, they tended to perceive the situation to 
be more threatening because of the absence of visual information. 
The presence of fire in emergency situations has an effect on the behaviours exhibited 
by passengers. Apart from presenting a tangible cue of the severity of an evolving situation, 
smoke in real incidents can cause both minor and major physiological effects, reduce an 
individual’s visibility and can be toxic (Oswald et al, 2005). By reducing visibility, smoke 
can make it more difficult for the affected people to find their way to their desired location 
(Galea and Gwynne, 2000a). This is either directly attributed to the volume of smoke within 
the immediate environment or reduce the ability for the individual to perceive visual cues 
from their surroundings. Reduced visibility or a lack of light may also reduce other cues and 
lead people to misinterpret the severity of the situation that can cause them to act contrary to 
the desired behaviour. For example, in a less severe situation, it may be desirable for 
passengers to remain on the train but a loss of light may cause them to interpret the situation 
as being more serious and therefore attempt to evacuate (RSSB, 2009). In the absence of 
visual cues it has been found that people tend to seek out walls in order to aid their navigation 
(Galea and Gwynne, 2000a) as well as to walk more slowly, take known routes, maintain 
contact with other people and walk towards lit areas (Capote et al, 2009). Thus in a situation 
whereby smoke plays a significant role, it may also act as a catalyst to drive common 
behaviours that could suddenly lead to bottlenecks, as individuals arrive at similar behaviour 
strategies. Another factor that may affect the behaviours of people because of a 
misinterpretation of the severity of the situation is the smell of fuel (RSSB, 2009). Close 
proximity to flames and an increased density of people in relation to nearby fire may induce 
competitive behaviours and attempts to flee. All of these effects that may be caused by the 
presence of fire may lead to slower egress (Galea and Gwynne, 2000a). 
Previous studies have identified a number of factors that could aid evacuation in 
railway emergencies. It has been found that ease of egress depends on the nature of the 
emergency, the design of the train, the population demographics and what the passengers are 
doing at the time of the emergency (Capote et al, 2009). In addition to this, any incapacitation 
of passengers or vehicle damage caused as a result of an accident will also impact on the ease 
of evacuation (RSSB, 2007). The design of the train may dictate that exits can be used. For 
example, if a train has overturned, some doors may be more difficult to open because of the 
need to push them upwards and opposing gravity. It has been suggested that the doors on 
either side of train carriages should open in opposing directions so that it should be possible 
to open at least one set of doors with relative ease if the train overturns (Galea and Gwynne, 
2000b; RGSB, 2009). It has also been suggested that carriage end doors should incorporate 
‘burst through panels’ so that in the event of their door mechanisms jamming, passengers are 
still able to escape. Emergency ceiling hatches could be implemented to provide additional 
exits in the event of an overturned train and to help emergency workers get access to injured 
passengers more rapidly (Galea and Gwynne, 2000a; 2000b). It is also important that 
passengers are made aware of the presence of such technologies to assist their evacuation, as 
previous accidents have illustrated that a lack of knowledge has resulted in failures to use 
such facilities appropriately (RSSB, 2009). For example, the operation of emergency release 
mechanisms for external doors through the use of appropriate signage and relevant instruction 
is particularly important. 
When trains overturn, any vertical fixtures spanning the height of the train (such as 
passenger poles or partitions) become horizontal obstacles and can impede egress. Where 
these fixtures are not essential, it is has been suggested that they should be reduced in height 
or removed altogether (Galea and Gwynne, 2000b). In addition, luggage (which is rarely 
secured) can move and cause obstructions or injury to passengers. In order to reduce this risk, 
it should either be secured to the luggage racks (Galea and Gwynne, 2000a) or stored in 
alternative locations between the seats (Galea and Gwynne, 2000b). 
The way in which passengers are notified of an emergency situation can also 
influence the time taken to evacuate. Research has illustrated that egress times are faster 
when passengers are notified before the train comes to a stop (Capote et al, 2009). In this way 
passengers are able to begin processing what is happening and prepare their exit strategies. 
Notifications should be audible rather than visible because of the potential for reduced 
visibility (Kangedal and Nilsson, 2002; Oswald et al, 2005). It has also been suggested that 
announcements should contain detailed information such as: evacuation instructions, 
information about the status of the evacuation process and the environmental conditions 
(Oswald et al, 2005). These announcements should be timely and made at regular intervals in 
order to minimise uncertainty and confusion (Oswald et al, 2005; RSSB, 2009). Passengers 
are more likely to follow instructions if communications are presented with increased 
frequency and in an authoritative manner, especially when the instructions relate to actions 
that are not intuitive (RSSB, 2009). In addition, when communications are made face to face, 
they are more effective than those made over loudspeaker systems although this may be more 
difficult on trains where official staff are usually limited in number (RSSB, 2009). 
Although visibility may be compromised, the use of signage can assist the evacuation 
process. Signs can be placed to both direct passengers to emergency exits and emergency 
equipment as well as to indicate how to use such apparatus. However, it should be ensured 
that the signage is simple and easy to understand (Oswald et al, 2005). Emergency lighting 
such as that found in aircraft and ships may also be used to direct people to emergency exits 
(Galea and Gwynne, 2000a; Oswald et al, 2005). Suggestions have also been made that 
information regarding emergency procedures could be made available on trains either within 
on-train magazines, on the backs of seats or using seat back entertainment systems where 
present (Galea and Gwynne, 2000b). However, analysis of past accidents has shown that 
when safety cards had been available, passengers did not read them (Galea and Gwynne, 
2000b). Therefore, alternative approaches are required in order to ensure that passengers are 
aware of emergency procedures or that aviation style safety briefings are conducted (RSSB, 
2009). 
While various methods of aiding egress have been discussed above, it is also 
acknowledged that evacuation is not desirable in all rail emergencies (RSSB, 2009). It has 
been suggested that in general, passengers should aim to remain on the train unless they are 
in immediate danger. They should attempt to move to a safe location within their current 
carriage and await rescue. Passengers should only fully evacuate the train where it is not 
possible to move to a safe location within the train. Train carriages can be designed in such a 
way that they encourage passengers to remain in their carriage by including features such as 
emergency lighting that aids passengers in identifying the severity of the situation without 
leading them towards the exits. In addition, windows should not be promoted as an egress 
route as their height above the ground on the outside of the train can make them dangerous to 
use. They should also be made of materials that are designed to contain passengers within the 
carriage and protect them from external objects (RSSB, 2007). 
 
Discussion 
Given the generic models of human behaviour in emergencies, it is apparent that the two 
modes of transport and the environments in which they operate exhibit different 
characteristics in their operational domains. Table 1 summarises the key differences between 
aviation and rail. 
INSERT TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
From this overview, there is more potential to control how passengers behave in the 
aviation domain than in the rail domain. In the rail context, passengers are largely unknown 
and it can be more difficult to account for those that might have been travelling on a specific 
train or in a particular carriage. As the rail domain represents an open security system, where 
people can enter and leave stations freely, there is usually very limited information about the 
number or nature of the individual passengers. Once on a train they are free to move around 
as they wish without necessarily having a specific seat reservation or allocation. The 
environment may be more restricted as large and bulky luggage is stored in passenger 
compartments in an ad-hoc manner with very little (if any) oversight. There is little staff 
visibility and unless there is information displayed in the carriage it may not be apparent what 
the correct course of action should be in an emergency or for different types of emergency. 
The rail domain therefore offers a more challenging environment to monitor and coordinate 
activities in an emergency as it may not even be known how many passengers occupy a 
particular carriage or have wandered away or been thrown from a train in the event of an 
accident. 
In reviewing the rail and aviation domains, specific focus has been given to methods 
of behavioural prediction, behaviour in emergencies and methods of aiding egress. Although 
the operational contexts of rail and aviation are different, the methods employed have similar 
characteristics and researchers need to be aware of the potential concerns. Trials involving 
participants pose ethical issues such as the risk of injury and stress (OTA, 1993). There are 
also concerns about the validity of behaviours demonstrated in recreated or simulated 
emergencies and how far the findings transfer to real world contexts (Muir and Thomas, 
2004). An alternative approach used in both rail and aviation is computer-based simulations. 
Again this approach is not without limitations. In particular a simulation is only as good as 
the data upon which it is built. However it does allow for the investigation of factors such as 
fire, smoke and explosions that would be unethical to study using actual passengers in real 
environments (Owen et al, 1999). 
Considering the behaviour of passengers in emergencies, both rail and aviation 
domains demonstrate changes in the level of altruism shown by passengers, in relation to an 
awareness of the event, the perceived danger of the event or the relative time to evacuate. 
Cooperative behaviours have been demonstrated in both domains but these can be susceptible 
to experimental effects such as priming, practise and motivation. It has also been 
demonstrated in aviation that some passengers may exhibit signs of cognitively induced 
paralysis (Leach, 2004). This could be because of the perceived locus of control by 
passengers. As procedures are more controlled in aviation, it could be that passengers expect 
to be told what to do, whereas in the rail domain there is an expectation of a higher degree of 
self-reliance and a necessity to conduct self-initiated evacuations.  
The specific circumstances of any given emergency situation seem to dictate how 
people behave. Differences have been shown as a result of different environmental factors, 
differences between individuals in different populations and the timing of notifications and 
the way in which these have been delivered. Different behaviours can be linked to the generic 
models of human behaviour described earlier. The behaviours exhibited by passengers in rail 
emergencies are similar those shown in aviation emergencies. At times, people in both modes 
of transport have been shown to exhibit both self-centred (Sime, 1980; March, 1994) and 
collaborative behaviours (Mawson, 1978, 1980, 2005) depending on the circumstances. This 
would appear to suggest that no single model of human behaviour fully captures the diversity 
of potential behaviours that may be displayed by a given individual when confronted with an 
emergency situation. Furthermore, while the panic model might not be generally accepted, 
there are occasions when people may exhibit selfish and irrational behaviours (CIRAS, 
2009). 
It has been identified that in both aviation and rail, the internal configuration of the 
train carriages or aircraft cabins and the location and type of emergency exit can play a part 
in ease of egress in an emergency (Snow et al, 1970). In addition to this, it has been 
suggested that railway carriages would benefit from audio communications as well as 
improved visual cues to facilitate exit identification (RSSB, 2009). Taking established 
knowledge from the aviation domain it is also considered that the provision of training or 
information regarding emergency procedures could assist passengers in carrying out the 
appropriate actions for a given situation (OTA,1993). However, it is noted that the way in 
which this information is reinforced may require further research. In aviation, it has been 
shown that when cabin crew are assertive, egress is faster (Muir, 1996). As trains do not 
usually have the same ratio of staff to passengers on board, other methods of passenger 
communication and control (such as detailed announcements made through dedicated 
channels at regular intervals) might provide a useful alternative.  
Finally, it is worth noting that both domains share a drive towards increasing levels of 
regulation as illustrated by the activities of the EASA, FAA and the RSSB. Although 
evacuation regulations provide stringent standards that designers and operators must abide 
by, it is apparent that there are lessons to be learned through increased dialogue between 
these transport modes, especially as, in the future, there will be an increasing need to consider 
the requirements and user experience of multi-modal travel through continuous journey 
initiatives.  
 
Conclusion 
Two different operational contexts have been reviewed alongside the current models and 
theories of human behaviour in emergencies. It is apparent that no single model or theory 
exists to capture the complexity and diversity of behaviours in different emergency contexts 
but that a clear understanding of human behaviour in these situations is vital. A large amount 
of research attention has been focussed on the aviation domain that offers a basis to expand 
the knowledge base and future policy in dealing with rail emergencies. 
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 Figure 1: Models of human behaviour in emergencies based on indices of rationality and 
social norms. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of operational contexts for aviation and rail 
 Aviation Rail 
Staffing Staff visible to most passengers Staff not visible to all passengers 
Evacuation briefings Formal briefings always provided and demonstrated to all 
passengers 
No formal briefings although some information might be 
posted on displays in carriages 
Passenger control Largely controlled by air operators (ground crew and cabin 
crew) 
Passengers generally uncontrolled (although may be monitored 
by CCTV) 
Contact with crew Regular updates from cockpit crew and allocated cabin crew 
that are frequently in view 
Automated announcements and unlikely to see staff 
 
Passenger identity Numbers and identities known from check-in records and 
passports 
Largely unknown – although records may exist for ticket sales 
for specific journeys 
Passenger movement while in transit Regulated by aircrew during the flight Generally free to move around as they wish 
Passenger location Strict numbers assigned to areas of the aircraft and passengers 
located in specific seats during important phases of flight 
Irregular amounts of passengers (sometimes overcrowded, 
other times relatively empty cabins) Passengers may be seated 
or standing anywhere in cabin at any time 
Environment Within aircraft the environment is controlled and access denied 
to specific areas based on class of travel and actively 
supervised by flight crew 
The train environment is largely uncontrolled as passengers 
may move between carriages and are not actively supervised by 
staff 
Potential for distraction Low – controlled use of personal electronic devices and other 
media 
High – free use of personal devices and media 
Time of day Some commuter traffic but generally aircraft passengers are 
more controlled and constrained within aircraft and terminals 
Passenger numbers fluctuate on trains and in stations during the 
day 
Luggage/baggage screening Passengers usually only have small hand luggage with them, 
larger luggage is transferred to the hold – all baggage is 
screened 
Passengers have to carry all their luggage into the carriage – 
very limited baggage screening (for example, Eurostar) 
 
